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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD E. LISH, JR., 
Plaintif f-R esponden t, 
vs. Case No. 
\
' 12474 
UTAH PO\VER & LIGHT 
COMPANY, a Maine corporation, . 
Defendant-Appellant . . 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT IV 
Plaintiff contends in Point IV of Respondent's 
brief that the amount which the jury awarded to plain-
tiffs as special damages over and above medical expenses 
should be added to the jury award for general damages. 
Defendant respectfully submits that the facts and the 
law do not support such a contention. 
1 
The case was submitted to the jury and a verdict 
was returned awarding plaintiff $32,500.00 in general 
damages and $17,500.00 in special damages ('T. 319). 
The court noted to both parties that the special damages 
exceeded the limit it had placed on the jury of $3,424.H 
which limit was contained in the jury instruction num-
ber 6 ( T. 21). The court suggested that the error could 
be corrected by motion and to that both parties agreed 
(T. 319, 320). 
The court then asked both parties whether either 
of them had any objection to the discharge of the jury. 
Neither party objected and the jury was discharged 
(T. 320). 
A motion was made by defendant that the verdict 
as to special damages be amended to conform to the 
special damages pleaded and stated in the jury instruc-
tions ( T. 320) . 
Plaintiff thereafter moved that the pleaded special 
damages as reflected in jury instruction number 6 be 
amended by increasing it by $400.00 to include the cost 
of a future medical procedure testified to during trial. 
The addition of this sum brought the special damage 
figure pleaded and stated in the jury instructions to 
$3,824.44, and defendant stated that it had no objection 
to this amendment (T. 320, 321). 
The verdict as to special damages was then amended 
from $17 ,500.00 to $3,824.44. Thereafter the following 
exchange took place between the Court and counsel: 
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"THE COURT: Then I will amend by inter-
lineation the special damage figure to 
$3,824.44. 
MR. KIPP: 'Ve make no objection to that. 
THE COURT: The verdict may be filed. 
MIL CHILD: Showing a total verdict of what, 
then, your Honor? 
THE COURT: $32,500.00 plus $3,824.44. 
MR. KIPP: Correct. 
THE COURT: Anything further for the pres-
ent time, counsel? 
l\IR. KIPP: 'Ve have nothing further, your 
Honor." (T. 321). 
Subsequently, plaintiff made a motion to reform the 
yerdict by adding the sum of $13,675.56 to general dam-
ages ( R. 27) ; this motion was denied by the trial court 
(R. 30). 
Plaintiff is apparently contending that it was the 
intent of the jury to award plaintiff an additional 
$13,675.56 in general damages. Obviously, at this point 
it is impossible to tell what the intent of the jury may 
have been. 
Rule 47 (r) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
nrovides for the correction of an insufficient or incorrect • 
jury verdict: 
"Correction of Verdict. If the verdict rendered is 
informal or insufficient, it may be corrected by 
the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury 
may lJC .:crzt out ayain." (Emphasis added.) 
3 
After the jury verdict was returned, defendant not 
only failed to request that the court apply the provisions 
of Rule 47 ( r) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but 
also agreed to the dismissal of the jury without so much 
as even raising the issue of an increase in general dam-
ages. Instead plaintiff stipulated that the correct verdict 
was $32,500.00 in general damages and $3,824.44 in 
special damages ( T. 321). 
In the case of Jorgensen v. Gonzales, 14 Utah 2d 
330, 383 P.2d 934 (1963), the jury brought back aver-
dict for plaintiff in the amount of $368.49 in special 
damages and $1,131.51 in general damages. The odd 
amounts prompted the court to question the jury fore-
man about the possibility of a quotient or chance ver-
dict. Under such questioning it was revealed that the 
jury had improperly considered one element of general 
damages. Thereupon, the court instructed the jury to 
go out and reconsider its verdict. The jury returned 
with a different verdict for general damages. This court 
held that such a course of action was not only within the 
prerogative of the trial court under Rule 47 ( r), but en-
tirely proper and discreetly handled. 
The case of Brown v. Johnson, 24 Utah 2d 388, 472 
P .2d 942 ( 1970) , involved an issue almost identical to 
the one presented before this court. In that case the court 
instructed the jury that special damages could not ex-
ceed $377.50. The jury returned a verdict of $10,000.00 
for special damages. When the court saw the obvious 
error, it gave further directions to the jury and sent it 
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back out to redeliberate. The jury returned with a ver-
dict of $11,322.50 in general damages and $377.50 in 
special damages. This court held that this was a proper 
procedure under Rule 47 ( r) . 
Plaintiff was free in the case at bar to request that 
the trial court send the jury back to redeliberate in ac-
cordance with Rule 47 ( r) of the U tab Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Instead the plaintiff chose to reduce the spe-
cial damages by stipulation and to have the jury dis-
charged. The failure to make such a request while the 
jury was still impaneled prevents plaintiff from now 
objecting to the insufficiency of the verdict. The trial 
court judge could not nor can this court know now what 
might have been the intent of the jury. 
A number of courts have held that a party who fails 
to object to the irregularity of the verdict at the time it is 
returned is thereby precluded from claiming error in 
the verdict. 
In Brown v. Regan, 10 Cal. 2d 519, 75 P.2d 1063 
( 1938) the Supreme Court of California in considering 
a verdict which could have been corrected by the jury, 
stated: 
" ... The proper procedure where an informal or 
insufficient verdict has been returned is for the 
trial court to require the jury to return for fur-
ther deliberation. Kerrison v. Unger, 135 Cal. 
App. 607, 611, 27 P.2d 927. There can be no 
doubt, in view of the record presented on appeal, 
that had the jury been required by the trial court 
to retire for further deliberation under proper 
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instructions, a proper verdict would have been 
returned. It is well established by numerous au-
thorities that, when a verdict is not in proper 
form and the jury is not required to clarify it, 
any error in said verdict is waived by the party 
relying thereon who at the time of its rendition 
failed to make any request that its formality or 
uncertainty be corrected . ... " Brown at 1065, 
1066. (Emphasis added.) 
In Hamilton v. Wrang, 221 A.2d 605 (Del. 1966), 
an action for personal injuries and property damages 
arising out of an automobile accident, the jury verdict 
was for car damages only. On appeal, plaintiff stated 
that the verdict was void because it failed to award dam-
ages to plaintiff in a stated amount. It appeared that 
during the trial the parties had stipulated that the 
amount of damages to the car was $511.00. The plain-
tiff made no objection to the form of the verdict at the 
time it was announced and the jury was thereafter dis-
charged. The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the 
lower court decision upholding the jury verdict stating: 
"The failure of the plaintiffs to object to the form 
of the verdict is fatal to their contention in this 
appeal that it is a nullity because of its allegedly 
defective form. It is necessary in order to take 
advantage of a supposed defect in the form of a 
verdict that the aggrieved party take exception 
to it prior to the discharge of the jury, and the 
failure to do so amounts to a waiver of the point. 
[citation] The reason for the rule is that upo? ! 
timely objection the trial judge prior to the jurys 
discharge can instruct it to correct a faulty ver· 
diet." Hamilton at G06. (Emphasis added.) 
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In a motion to reform the verdict, plaintiff had a 
hearing before the trial court on this very question. 
There plaintiff had an opportunity to present his argu-
ments and have the court consider them. After so doing, 
this motion was denied. 
As plaintiff pointed out in Point I of his brief, there 
is a presumption of validity on appeal of the judgment 
and proceedings in the trial court. This being the case it 
must be presumed that the judgment which was rendered 
in the trial court and agreed to by plaintiff is correct. 
The case of Gordon v. Provo City, 15 Utah 2d 287, 391 
P.2d 430 ( 1964), cited by the plaintiff states that the 
burden is on the moving party to demonstrate some per-
suasive reason for upsetting the judgment. Since plain-
tiff cites no authority for his Point IV, it must be pre-
sumed that he has not met the burden placed upon him. 
To the contrary, it would appear that the weight of 
authority forbids the court to increase the amount of a 
jury verdict: 
"As a general rule where the determination of 
the amount of recovery is exclusively within the 
province of the jury, the court has no power to 
amend the verdict by increasing the amount 
found by the jury; * * *" 89 C.J.S., Trial, Sec-
tion 517 (1955). 
Finally, plaintiff claims that it is clear that the jury 
intended this to be compensation for lost income. It is 
submitted that it is not at all clear that the figure of 
~13,675.56 represents what the jury intended to be 
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awarded for lost income. It is to be noted that the figure 
itself is a most curious amount which does not correlate 
to any evidence or amounts that were presented at trial. 
It is further to be noted that plaintiff's complaint only , 
prayed for lost income in the approximate sum of 
$7,000.00. The figure now being sought is almost double 
the amount for which plaintiff prayed. In short, it is im-
possible to know at this point what, if anything, the 
figure of $13,675.56 represented to the jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
RAMON M. CHILD, ESQ. 
M. JOHN ASHTON, ESQ. 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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